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Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen1
Research in Charles Sanders Peirce’s thought has grown rapidly both within and out-
side the arenas of semiotics and philosophy on the global level. Peirce’s pioneering 
contributions to philosophy, pragmatism, logic, the theory of signs, methodology, 
philosophy and history of science and to numerous further fi elds are currently being 
explored not only in philosophy and semiotics but also in sciences and in art studies.
Th e second instalment of the Applying Peirce conference, fi rst held in Helsinki in June 
2007 in conjunction with the 9th World Congress of Semiotics, was held in Tallinn 
and Helsinki on 21–23 April, 2014. Th e gathering brought together around 50 schol-
ars and researchers to explore and discuss Peirce’s thought and its applications in the 
diverse fi elds of contemporary academia.
Th e year 2014 marks the centenary of Peirce’s death in Milford, Pennsylvania, on 
19 April 1914. Th e second Applying Peirce conference was the only one celebrating 
the centennial as close to the actual date as possible. Th e offi  cial centennial celebra-
tion took place in mid-July 2014 in Lowell, Massachusetts. Other events commemo-
rating the occasion have been held during 2014 at least in Italy, the Czech Republic 
and China. 
Th e Second Applying Peirce was also rather special in that it took place in 
the twin cities of Tallinn and Helsinki – sometimes termed Talsinki though not 
Hellinn  – connected by a two-hour ferry ride across the Gulf of Finland which is 
one of the most populated ferry routes in the world. Th e events of the fi rst day were 
held at the Tallinn University of Technology, hosted by the Chair of Philosophy. On 
the morning of the second day, conference participants sailed across the gulf and 
enjoyed the continuation of sessions at the University of Helsinki, now hosted by the 
Peirce Research Centre and the Helsinki semiotics programme in the beautiful set-
ting of the musicologists’ lecture hall.
Th e programme consisted of four workshops and a nice selection of contributed 
papers. In total 36 presentations were delivered. Th e opening workshop was “Peirce 
and His Students”, organized by Jean-Marie Chevalier and Amirouche Moktefi . Th e 
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purpose was to assess the extent of relationships between Peirce and his pupils, stu-
dents, collaborators, as well as successors and inheritors, together with the wider 
aims of establishing to what extent these notions themselves might call for historical 
and philosophical clarifi cation when it comes to the legacies of great minds.
Th e opening paper “Second Metaphysical Club and its general signifi cance to 
the development of American science” was by Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen. Now it has 
sometimes been claimed that, unlike many other classic thinkers, Charles Peirce had 
few or even no intellectual heirs. Although he held no permanent academic posi-
tion in his entire life, Peirce led the Baltimore Metaphysical Club in 1879–1883 and 
instructed a famous circle of students of logic and philosophy at Johns Hopkins 
University during those years. He lectured throughout his life, developed corre-
spondence courses and collaborated with a number of scientists. For example, it was 
his joint work with his student Joseph Jastrow that came to defi ne what became the 
fi eld of experimental psychology. A wealth of historical evidence abounds which 
testifi es to the impact of the works and collaborations Peirce had during the Johns 
Hopkins era.
Furthermore, Peirce’s massive correspondence reveals that many were eager 
to learn from his tuition. He wrote long responses and designed the courses with 
attention to detail, even to that of teaching and pedagogy, although the delivery may 
not have been entirely successful on site. Th anks to the eff orts of Ladd-Franklin and 
many other students of his, a Peircean school of logic may have been in the mak-
ing already in his lifetime, naturally with lively debates on what such a new logic 
should look like. Th ese and many other issues thus appear to invite a closer investi-
gation of Peirce’s legacy as evidenced by his students, including John Dewey, Allan 
Marquand, Fabian Franklin, Christine Ladd-Franklin, Oscar Howard Mitchell, 
Benjamin Ives Gilman, Joseph Jastrow, Ellery W. Davis, Th orstein Veblen, Josiah 
Royce, Washington Irving Stringham and Henry Taber.
Th e workshop prompted questions such as: How do Peirce’s teachings show up in 
the careers of Dewey, James, and others? What was Peirce’s overall infl uence on his 
colleagues and collaborators? What was his own place in academia and those of his 
research groups? What was the impact of the Metaphysical Club on the development 
of science and philosophy? What was the nature of the Peircean lineage in logic? 
What, in fact, was Peirce’s real infl uence on Ramsey and on the Cambridge (UK) 
community? What was Welby’s signifi cs in comparison to Peirce’s, and what was the 
real reception of pragmaticism in Peirce’s own lifetime?
Th e day in Tallinn continued with lively sessions on semiotics and perception. 
At the Helsinki end, the day began with a workshop on theorematic reasoning, 
organized by Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen, with Frederik Stjernfelt as an invited speaker. 
Stjernfelt presented a new classifi cation of theorematic reasoning types, published 
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and presented in detail in his new book Natural Propositions (Docent Press, 2014). 
Two more workshops were held during the second day: one on abduction organized 
by Sami Paavola and the other on Peirce and the social sciences organized by Mats 
Bergman. Lively discussions ensued. Th e contributed talks were grouped in the ses-
sions on history of science and epistemology, and science and inquiry.
Two plenary talks were presented on the evening of the second day, one by 
Helmut Pape entitled “Compulsions, forces and assertions: Peirce on the semiotics 
of rhetorics” and the other by Jaakko Hintikka with the title “Th e place of Peirce in 
the history of logic”. According to Pape, Peirce’s rhetoric was a bouquet of confl icting 
conceptions ranging from truth-enhancing methods of research and representation 
(Peirce’s methodeutic) to a general theory of conditions of understanding and com-
munication (Peirce’s universal rhetoric). Pape argued that contrary to appearances, 
Peirce developed some of these approaches in more detail than has previously been 
recognized. Pape then presented a wealth of detailed rhetorical considerations that 
are present in semiotics, most importantly the dialogical one, which could also be 
termed the game-theoretical model of the meaning of assertions, albeit one in which 
the interaction should be seen as taking place in a cooperative mood. 
Hintikka proceeded to argue that Peirce’s work is relevant to the future of logical 
theory in several diff erent respects. He began by presenting the celebrated question: 
Is there a curtain between language and the world (‘language as a universal medium’, 
a view that used to be predominant in the past), or is language a tool for representa-
tion (‘language as calculus’, or the model-theoretic view, which emerged much later)? 
Hintikka noted how Peirce’s logic is grounded on important semiotic and semantic 
views, of which Tarski, having held a certain static view on semantics, did not man-
age to say nearly everything there is to be said. Peirce’s pictorial view, his view on 
the dynamic nature of the language-world relations, is created and maintained by 
human institutions, stated Hintikka, and mentioned how Peirce’s logic of quantifi ers 
was an explicitly game-theoretic one in which quantifi ers do not simply ‘range over’ 
the objects in the universe of discourse: through their formal dependencies they 
express the actual dependencies of their variables on each other. He then identifi ed a 
dramatic development in the history of logic, namely that Frege did not understand 
the all-important dependence-indication of quantifi ers, and so what came to be 
regarded as proper fi rst-order logic is seriously fl awed. Hintikka noted that another 
correction also is needed: Peirce was aware of the basic problematic concerning the 
role of quantifi ers in a logical theory, though he did not spell it out fully. In a striking 
contrast to Frege, whose logic was not fully adequate to account for the reasoning 
as exhibited in the mathematics of his time, Peirce even managed to correct errors 
that some mathematicians were led to in the light of the analysis that the depend-
ence-indication of quantifi ers can bring out. According to Hintikka, logic calls for 
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experimentation on diff erent kinds of structures and models, systematizing, among 
others, the study and analysis of thought experiments. He then pointed out the 
importance of icons in logical theorizing, such as the logic of existential graphs, and 
articulated the diff erence between the corollarial and theorematic reasoning in terms 
of how many individuals are needed in models: the reasoning is corollarial when 
there is no need for new individuals, while it is theorematic when new individuals 
need to be introduced. Th is was what Peirce called his “fi rst real discovery in logic”. 
Hintikka also mentioned connections of these topics with the theory of computa-
tion, such as the length of proofs and the P vs. NP problem. What makes reasoning 
non-trivial thus aff ects the status of decision problems, among others.
Many more papers of vital importance were presented in nine diff erent sessions 
which cannot even briefl y be described in a short report. In summary, the confer-
ence explored the manifold applicability of Peirce’s thought to current questions 
and problems in various disciplines across the sciences and the arts. Th e aims of the 
meeting, namely to identify where some of the leading edge on Peirce studies in con-
nection to fi elds in sciences and arts is to be found, were largely met. Th ose fi elds 
include the areas of history of science; mathematics, logic & diagrams; abductive 
reasoning; communication & rhetoric; cognitive & computing sciences; linguistics, 
pragmatics & semiotics; fi ne arts & design; physics, biology, & geology; psychology, 
economics & sociology; and anthropology & archaeology, all covered in one way or 
another during the three days of intensive talks.
Th e Applying Peirce conference testifi ed that Peirce’s thought is very much in 
touch with living science, representing a fi eld of research and not, as Max Fisch and 
Nicholas Rescher have aptly formulated, “the strife of systems”. Th e end-of-the-day 
discussions during the much-due reception time were facilitated by the three types 
of Peirce wines that Helmut Pape’s Vinosofi a produced in Bamberg, Germany, 
savoured with the three types of Roquefort cheese (Peirce’s own favourite brand of 
cheese) selected and fl own over from France by Peirce experts for this sole purpose.
Th e conference was sponsored by the Ragnar Nurkse School of Innovation and 
Governance in Tallinn; the Jenny and Antti Wihuri Foundation, the Federation of 
Finnish Learned Societies in Helsinki; and the DiaMind project (Diagrammatic 
Mind: Th e Logical and Cognitive Aspects of Iconicity, funded by the Estonian 
Research Council and the Academy of Finland) in Talsinki, all of which are acknow-
ledged with pleasure.
